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Abstract  
 This paper intends to reread what Richard Rorty introduced as ironist 
in the context of one of the most contested topics in the realm of social 
sciences; i.e. agency and structure. Rorty maintains that ironist is the 
potential citizen of utopian liberal democracy. An ironist, in his words, is a 
person who a) has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary 
she currently uses, b) realizes that argument phrased in her present 
vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve possible doubts, and c) she 
does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others. The main 
question of this study is where this conscious subject stands within the 
context of agency-structure dispute. First, relevant literature on the 
dichotomy is going to be examined, and then, while discussing other relevant 
terms in his philosophy, this paper will show how Rorty solves the agentic 
problem of his ironist with his introducing of the public-private distinction. 
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Introduction 
 There has been a seemingly everlasting debate over years within the 
scope of social sciences to set a balance between structure and agency. 
Different schools and figures of sociology have set forth a variety of reasons 
and justification on the importance or primacy of one over the other (See 
below). Not only have all these debates not reached a consensual conclusion, 
but an exact definition of the dichotomy and the importance of each wing 
highly depend on one’s theoretical orientation and their inclination toward a 
school of thought in sociology. All these orientations, however, attempt to 
find whether there are patterned arrangements (of different natures) which 
determine human behaviors and thoughts or it is the individuals’ autonomy 
(agency) which owns the capacity to act independently and to make their 
own free choices. 
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 On the other hand, ironist has been introduced by the American 
thinker Richard Rorty. Ironist, in his words, is the citizen of utopian liberal 
democracy. Such quality makes it plausible to quest ironist’s location in the 
above mentioned dichotomy. 
 Hence, the following sections intend to first shed some light on this 
very dichotomy. It is going to briefly review the literature exists around the 
structure-agency debate. Then, Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism will be 
discussed, and finally capability of his notion - the ironist - as the citizen of 
utopian liberal democracy will be examined in terms of his ability to 
deconstruct the structure-agency binary. 
 
Literature on the dichotomy  
 Many sociologists and schools of sociology have come up with 
different responses to this ontological question (i.e. agency vs. structure). 
One of the first schools of thought in modern times which began to provide 
some answers for the abovementioned dichotomy was Marxism or as it is 
called by some sociologists, including and mainly Randall Collins (1994), 
the conflict tradition. This tradition claims that “what occurs when conflict is 
not openly taking place is a process of domination” (Collins, 1994: 47). The 
conflict, according to this tradition, happens because of clashes between 
classes and the power differentials. Their assumption of the nature of conflict 
is mostly concerned with the economic phenomenon and moreover, 
according to Marx, exploitation of labor is the most significant manifestation 
of the materialistic dynamic of system. However, from Marx himself to later 
Marxist figures of twentieth century like Louis Althusser, two other 
considerations of the structure-agency dichotomy can be traced.  
 First, based on Marx (1852, 1932, and Marx and Engels, 1932), 
materialistic dialectic proves that history moves as a whole and there are 
inevitable sequences of history which have occurred and some are to come. 
Second, a less seen notion in Marx’s work which was widely developed by 
Althusser (1971) is the concept of ideology which disguises the exploitive 
arrangements of capitalist society. In Althusser‘s opinion, ideology is 
“endowed with a structure and a functioning such as to make it a non-
historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which that 
structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form 
throughout what we can call history” (Althusser, 1971: 161). States are able 
to control subjects as they themselves believe that their position within the 
social structure is natural. “Ideology, or the background ideas that we 
possess about the way in which the world must function and of how we 
function within it is, in this account, understood to be always present” 
(Lewis, 2014). He includes social institutions such as family, schools, 
churches, and so on as parts of society which are designated with the 
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function of reproduction of ideology. Prior to such description of structural 
ideologies, there was Marx as the forefather of conflict tradition who himself 
had referred to ideology. Marx and Engels (1932) believe that the 
superstructure of a society is determined by the ruling class and an ideology 
is devised to justify the state of affairs. This class employs religious, legal, 
political systems to control means of production. The dominant ideology can 
be religion (for example during feudalism period) or liberalism or democracy 
(during capitalism period) and it creates a form of false consciousness for the 
dominated class.  
 Nevertheless, it is true that orthodox Marxism tends to opt for 
structure rather than agency in their analyses by describing materialistic 
dialectic and the importance of the dominant ideology, however, they are 
revolutionary in prescription. They all, particularly Marx, appraise the 
potentiality of working class to start a revolution to succeed the dictatorship 
of proletariat. As a result, while he believes in a form of superiority of social 
structure in the movement of history, Marx not only acknowledges but also 
provokes agency of the subordinate class in a collective form to revolt. For 
example, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx writes: 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already, given and transmitted from the past” (1852: 5). It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their 
social being that determines their consciousness. 
 Next figure who devoted some to literature on the issue was Georg 
Simmel who pioneered in functional conflict theory. In his most famous 
work, referring to what we know as structure and agency today, Simmel 
(1903) begins by saying that “the deepest problems of modern life flow from 
the attempt of the individual to maintain the independence and individuality 
of his existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight 
of the historical heritage and the external culture and technique of life. The 
antagonism represents the most modern form of the conflict which primitive 
man must carry on with nature for his own bodily existence” (1903: 11). 
Moreover, in the process of sociability, he mentions hierarchy 
(superordination and subordination) as a fundamental issue. Throughout this 
process separate individuals with something that he calls association resolve 
into a state of togetherness (Ritzer, 2007). They are affected by all stimuli 
they receive from the hierarchical structure, hence become sociable; 
notwithstanding he does not see the system entirely gloomy for individuals. 
For example, he considers money as a liberating entity for individuals. 
Money, he argues, demolishes the omnipresent group controls of traditional 
society. And about the cause of such situation “nobody can say whether the 
intellectualistic mentality first promoted the money economy or whether the 
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latter determined the former.” (Wolf, 2003: 412). Thus, in his opinion 
structure and agency are both involved and interconnected. 
 The other figure is Emile Durkheim who is known as the most 
scientific sociologist. He begins with conducting a study on suicide and its 
motivations. In fact, he intends to prove that “social structures of high 
intensity prevent the individual from killing him/herself” (Collins, 1994: 
184). Referrimg to social structures, he means a great deal of ritualism and 
community control of individuals including all social rituals like the state of 
being married, of having children, or longing to a religion such as 
Catholicism. Society determines individuals so that the individual is in some 
structural situation in relation to other individuals within the structure; 
“Durkheim means the actual, physical pattern of who is in the presence of 
whom, for how long, and with how much space between them” (ibid). He 
also argues that “the individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than 
himself: namely, collective reality” (Durkheim, 1951: 38). Another 
important notion in Durkheim’s work (1982) is “social facts”. In his opinion, 
social facts offer resistance to individuals' will: they exert power over 
individuals' beliefs, forms of consciousness, behavior and cannot be 
modified by individuals' actions or changes in their beliefs, consciousness, 
and attitudes. Social facts include, but not limited to, institutions, social 
activities, roles, laws, beliefs, social morphology, statuses, population 
distribution, urbanization, etc. 
 Furthermore, since we are solidary with the group and share the 
group’s life, we are exposed to the influence of collective tendencies, but so 
far as we have a distinct personality of our own we rebel against and try to 
escape from them. Hence, he perceives suicide as the opposite extreme of 
social solidarity. Overall, it seems difficult to grasp Durkheim’s position in 
the debate about structure and agency. Because whereas he believes that the 
concomitant of a social structure which does not tightly constrain the 
individual results in the ability of agent to act, to commit suicide, Durkheim 
(1951) maintains that suicide often happens due to the lack of such social 
solidarity. In a sense it can be concluded that in case of presence of a strong 
social morphology, agency of individual is constrained and limited to norms 
and then society determines the individual.  
 The other figure who contributed a lot to literature on structure and 
agency was Talcott Parsons who introduced structural functionalism. His 
assumption of system and structure is something historical which consists of 
a set of values that are inculcated into individuals and it has the function of 
socialization through initially family, later also church, and then educational 
system (Collins, 1994: 201). On the other hand, his view of agency is not a 
voluntary entity which is based on total free will. However, it is framed 
within the patterned structure of relationships which are reproduced in social 
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order and norms. According to Parsons (1961), and based on his theoretical 
framework, i.e. structural functionalism, (social) institutions are integrated 
functionally to form a stable society. In fact, theorists of structural 
functionalism believe in a sense of social determinism which concedes the 
power of social system to shape individuals’ behavior.    
 On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, there was another tradition 
which would support human agency and consciousness rather than structure, 
rituals, or social order and norms. American micro-interactionism was 
greatly influenced by pragmatism. In pragmatism, it is theorized that 
practical consequences of our actions determine the truth, meaning is 
function, and there is an emphasis on the importance of symbols in 
interactions and communications. Pierce and Dewey, although were not 
sociologists, paved the way for other American sociologists in this tradition 
to discuss a social theory of the nature of mind and self rather than social 
structure. 
 This background allowed Cooley (1962) to say that human mind is a 
collective growth extending across ages, and also it is the locus of society in 
the broadest sense. He talks about the ability of individuals to shape a society 
and, unlike the functionalist approach, looks at the phenomenon from the 
other side of the table. Besides, other figures in this tradition such as Herbert 
Mead (1934) who are entitled as symbolic interactionist focus on self and 
objectivity of the world within the social realm. He, for example, believes 
that the individual mind can exist only in relation to other minds with shared 
meanings. They all emphasize on the importance of games to show the 
essence of agency in collaborations with others. Mead maintains “the ‘I’ 
always negotiates with other people rather than accepts preexisting social 
demands” (Collins, 1994: 260, citing Mead, 1934) 
 The last figure in this tradition, who is relevant to this topic, is Erving 
Goffman who tries to study the sociology of language and cognition.  For 
him, social structure always comes first and then as a secondary element 
subjective consciousness appears. In an attempt to criticize symbolic 
interactionism, he introduces frame analysis (Goffman, 1974). Frames are 
ways to organize experience–structure, an individual's perception of society. 
By comparing social interactions with a performance stage, Goffman aims to 
bridge the gap between structure and agency. He believes that among 
interactions and in those situations, the actor can choose his costumes and 
stage. Thus, he tends to set a balance between the power of structure and the 
penetration of agent.  
 Returning to Europe during the twentieth century, structuralism 
became extremely popular after the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1983[1916]) who introduced the distinction between signified and signifier 
in the study of a sign, the arbitrary nature of signs, and the relationships 
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among signs in a given language. Levi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, and later in 
the so called post-structuralism, Jacque Derrida were among the main figures 
of this movement who established a vast literature on structure and agency 
from different perspectives. In general, they agree that “‘I think, therefore I 
am’ is disqualified on a number of grounds. The ‘I’ is not immediately 
available to itself, deriving its identity as it does from its involvement in a 
system of signification” (Giddens, 1987: 88). 
 Levi-Strauss, who broadened structuralism to social sciences and 
especially anthropology, believes that culture, similar to language, is 
composed of hidden rules which govern the behavior of its practitioners 
(Levi-Strauss, 1962). What is more, processes of history, which govern 
human behavior, have been operating within cultures. He suggests that the 
structure of processes of human thought works the same in all cultures. Then, 
he goes on to introduce binary oppositions as the building blocks of human’s 
mental processes. Some of these oppositions include hot-cold, male-female, 
etc. The historical evaluation of these signs suggests that people are more 
determined within the boundaries of collective culture. 
 Michel Foucault is a figure whose name reminds everybody of 
structuralism. He also shares the idea that the entire system is more 
prominent than individuals. He attempted to find out how human sciences 
construct reality, structure and even the subject. He points at discourse to be 
the controller, producer and reproducer of the subject, its awareness and 
interactions. In The Order of Things (1972), he first introduces the 
overarching atmosphere as something called episteme within which the 
human knowledge emerges. When he reaches to the concept of discourse, 
power plays an important role. Power is everywhere and it articulates human 
relations and behaviors. In fact, “power is diffuse rather than concentrated, 
embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely 
coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them” 
(Gaventa, 2003: 1). Discourse exists everywhere, and no one can live outside 
because it is dominant over the ways of constituting knowledge, social 
practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations. There are some 
disciplinary mechanisms as well. Those who do not obey are punished and 
labeled as mad, sick, prisoners, etc.  
 Yet, at some levels Foucault became a revolutionary activist and 
writes about resistance and the chance to become freer. Although the result 
of his work on the side of agency is mostly gloomy, he utters in an interview: 
“One did not suggest what people ought to be, what they ought to do, what 
they ought to think and believe. It was a matter of showing how social 
mechanisms up to now have been able to work…and then, starting from 
there, one left to the people themselves, knowing all the above, the 
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possibility of self-determination and the choice of their own existence” 
(Spivak, 1996: 156). 
 The last figure this paper attempts to review is Jacque Derrida who 
developed the concept of binaries. He primarily says that these hierarchized 
binary oppositions have an effect on everything from our conception of 
language to our understanding of racial differences. Then regarding the 
subjectivity of individual, he concedes that thinkers like Foucault and other 
structuralists have changed the (ontological) definition of subject’s role 
(Derrida, 1992). “The ‘classical’ conception of subjectivity deconstructed in 
Derrida’s work conforms to a certain ‘metaphysics of presence’ or epistemic 
proximity. It implies a boundary demarcating what is ‘proper’ and proximate 
to a subject (its mental states, its body, its meanings, etc.) and what inheres 
in ‘other’ subjects or non-subjective things”(Roden, 2004: 95). There is an 
overquoted phrase from Derrida where he writes: "there is no outside-text" 
(Derrida, 1969: 227). He is interpreted to believe nothing exists but words. 
Here, a shift from discourse in Foucault’s idea to text in Derrida’s can be 
traced. It can be concluded that, now, agency is also limited to texts in which 
an individual lives. However, he puts forth deconstruction as a resolving 
technique. 
  
Richard Rorty 
 Richard Rorty was an American philosopher who is known to 
introduce Neopragmatism (cf. West, 1989; Hildebrand, 2003a, 2003b): It is a 
“contemporary and revisionary approach to classical American pragmatism 
committed to exploring the vision of an anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist, 
anti-representationalist philosophy from a broadly naturalist perspective 
which gives a central role to explaining linguistic practices as a means of 
dissolving or addressing philosophical problems. From this perspective mind 
and meaning are understood not as items ‘in the head’ but as abstractions 
from our practices of mutually interpreting each other’s actions and reactions 
within specific social and worldly environments.” (Macarthur, 2015) 
 In his most discussed books, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(1979) and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), Rorty writes about his 
tendency to Jacque Derrida, John Dewey, and Donald Davidson. I already 
referred to Derrida, and a bit of Dewey’s pragmatism as relevant persons to 
this paper. The other very important figure in Rorty’s thought is Donald 
Davidson whom Rorty quotes a lot in his books. Davidson is a philosopher 
of language who starts with addressing mind and intention -- both the 
phenomenological assumption of intentionality and the agentic intenions of 
speaker (cf. Searle, 1983). Davidson (1963) claims that an agent's reasons for 
acting should not and cannot be considered as the causes of that action, and 
argues that “rationalization [providing reasons to explain an agent's actions] 
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
43 
is a species of ordinary causal explanation” (Davidson, 1963: 685). On the 
other hand, on conventions, which had been aruged to be the main aspect of 
structure especially when it comes to language (cf. Austin, 1962; Strawson, 
1964; Avramides, 1999),  Davidson (1986) put his idea in a nutshell:   
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language 
is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. 
There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. 
We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which 
language-users acquire and then apply to cases. And we should try 
again to say how convention in any important sense is involved in 
language; or, as I think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate 
how we communicate by appeal to conventions. (Davidson, 1986: 
446) 
 Based on such conception of conventions and language, four key 
words could be found in Rorty’s philosophy – which was called social hope 
(Rorty, 1999) by himself: contingency, common sense, ironism, and 
solidarity. He reasons that contingency is the nature of language, selfhood, 
and a liberal community. On the contingency of language, he writes: “truth 
cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - 
because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true 
or false. The world on its own - unaided by the describing activities of 
human beings - cannot” (Rorty, 1989: 5). Instead of using discourse (as 
Derrida or Foucault did), he employs the term vocabularies to point out 
one‘s description of the world, in a clear reference to Wittgenstein’s 
language-games (Wittgenstein, 1953). He claims that these vocabularies are 
contingent and no one carries the truth: “we try to get to the point where we 
no longer worship anything, where we treat nothing as a quasi-divinity, 
where we treat everything - our language, our conscience, our community – 
as product of time and chance” (Rorty, 1989: 22). 
 He continues with the contingency of selfhood by referring to 
Nietzsche and writes: “in achieving this sort of self-knowledge we are not 
coming to know a truth which was out there (or in here) all the time. Rather, 
he [Nietzsche] saw self-knowledge as self-creation. The process of coming 
to know oneself, confronting one's contingency, tracking one's causes home, 
is identical with the process of inventing a new language: that is, of thinking 
up some new metaphors. For any literal description of one's individuality, 
which is to say any use of an inherited language-game for this purpose, will 
necessarily fail” (ibid: 27). Self-creation is a strategy for an individual who 
does not need to depend on philosophy to find moral basis for their behavior. 
Subsequently, he reaches to the contingency of liberal community and puts it 
in these words: “I shall claim that the vocabulary I adumbrated in the first 
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two chapters [for the contingency of language and the contingency of 
selfhood], one which revolves around notions of metaphor and self-creation 
rather than around notions of truth, rationality, and moral obligation, is better 
suited for this purpose” (ibid: 44). In his utopian liberal community, nobody 
needs philosophical foundations to build moral citizens, and “the citizens of 
my liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of the contingency of 
their language of moral deliberation, and thus of their consciences, and thus 
of their community” (ibid: 61). Ironist is one who “is fully aware of the 
contingency of her own stance, of the contingency of skepticism itself, which 
is nothing more than a ‘final vocabulary’ among other vocabularies” 
(Tinland, 2009: 31) and this paves the way for him to conclude that these 
citizens would be (called) liberal ironists. 
 
Ironist 
 Rorty begins his description of the ironist with a really interesting 
evaluation of two figures of sociology: “To put the differences crudely: 
Michel Foucault is an ironist who is unwilling to be a liberal, whereas Jürgen 
Habermas is a liberal who is unwilling to be an ironist” (ibid: 61). Then he 
furthers to elaborate his definition of a liberal ironist. First, Rorty defines 
what he means by final vocabulary: 
All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to 
justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words 
in which we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our 
enemies, our long-term projects, our deepest self-doubts and our 
highest hopes. They are the words in which we tell, sometimes 
prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives. I 
shall call these words a person's final vocabulary.(ibid: 73) 
 This is the limit an individual can go, and there is hopeless passivity 
over the limit. It is final because “if doubt is cast on the worth of these 
words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse” (ibid). Then he 
jumps to the definition of an ironist, a person who fulfills three conditions: 
 (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary 
she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other 
vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has 
encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present 
vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) 
insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think 
that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch 
with a power not herself. (ibid) 
 Such an ironist is aware that her words are subject to change and sees 
the contingency and fragility of her final vocabulary. Meanwhile, Rorty 
attacks common sense as the opposite pole of irony. If one believes in 
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common sense, it means that they take for granted a final vocabulary in its 
totality. Furthermore, an ironist is a nominalist who does not search 
philosophy for a foundation for nation-making or morality. Being ironist is 
not enough for such a citizen, thus she must also be a liberal. So, Rorty 
“borrows his definition of a "liberal" from Judith Shklar” (Bernstein, 1990: 
37) where he reiterates that a liberal believes in two moral principles that 
first, they do not harm others and second, they should not be indifferent to 
others being harmed (Rorty, 1989: 74). Instead of metaphysics, ironist is 
interested in dialectic to play off different final vocabularies. Rorty claims 
that the modern form of dialectic is literary criticism by which the ironist can 
play off texts and vocabularies. 
 
Agency of the Ironist 
 It is difficult to drag the concept of ironist, which has not been fully 
instantiated, to the larger context of structure-agency. Nevertheless, Rorty’s 
definitions and examples can be employed for the sake of analysis. While 
Rorty concedes that language, or in his words, vocabularies with which and 
in which ironist understands and lives the world, he puts a great deal of 
emphasis on the self-creation of ironist. In the definition of ironist, he refers 
both to Mead and Dewey when he is describing the quality of self-creation, 
and to Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Derrida when describing language. 
However, it seems the most prominent feature of ironist is that she 
acknowledges her agency. Rorty writes: “I call people of this sort ironists 
because their realization that anything can be made to look good or bad by 
being redescribed, and their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria 
of choice between final vocabularies, puts them in the position which Sartre 
called "meta-stable” (ibid: 73).  
 Therefore, he does not believe that there is only one final vocabulary 
(or discourse or even structure) to live in. He encourages the agent to select 
and built his cognition by reading literature and employing literary criticism. 
In this regard and from such a point of view, he criticizes structuralists and 
their focus on structure. He describes Foucault (though he is named by Rorty 
as a non-liberal ironist) in these words: 
“[Foucault] accepts Mead's view that the self is a creation of society. 
Unlike them, he is not prepared to admit that the selves shaped by 
modern liberal societies are better than the selves earlier societies 
created. A large part of Foucault's work - the most valuable part, in 
my view - consists in showing how the patterns of acculturation 
characteristic of liberal societies have imposed on their members’ 
kinds of constraints of which older, premodern societies had not 
dreamed. He is not, however, willing to see these constraints as 
compensated for by a decrease in pain, any more than Nietzsche was 
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willing to see the resentfulness of ‘slave-morality‘ as compensated 
for by such a decrease.” (ibid: 63) 
 He gives a reason to Foucault similar to his defence of liberal 
democracy against Marxists‘ criticism. He usually avoids using 
philosophical justification to prove liberal democracy, but he draws his left 
critics‘ attention to the experienced history. As soon as one looks back at 
history, they will notice all the progress human society has made. In Rorty’s 
opinion, the credit must be taken by human endeavor; agency. Yet, he can 
understand the power relations which are described in Frankfurt school and 
Foucault’s texts. He notes: 
I agree with Habermas that Foucault's account of how power has 
shaped our contemporary subjectivity filters out all the aspects under 
which the eroticization and internalization of subjective nature also 
meant a gain in freedom and expression. More important, I think that 
contemporary liberal society already contains the institutions for its 
own improvement – an improvement which can mitigate the dangers 
Foucault sees. (ibid: 65) 
 Hence, according to Rorty, liberal society enjoys some institutions 
which work to improve conditions of living. Rorty does not phrase exactly 
how much these institutions can introduce limits and boundaries for 
individuals. However, it seems that he takes them for granted. He does not 
like to go back to what thinkers like Hobbes or Rousseau said about the 
social contract and the state of nature. He admits that there are some 
institutions and also language. After all human efforts, we are improving in a 
liberal democracy. But, still one might wonder how we can neglect the 
existing structure. 
 To answer this question, we had better introduce another binary in his 
mind; i.e. the public-private dinsticntion. Rorty (1989) suggests that public 
sphere is where structure governs and the private sphere in where agency 
(aka irony, self-creation, etc.) plays the main role. “We have two 
irreconciliable final vocabularies: one where the desire for self-creation and 
autonomy dominates, and another one where what dominates is the desire for 
community” (Mouffe, 1996: 3). Thus, his philosophy of hope is a description 
of a path: as human society is improving, the private sphere is becoming 
broader and the public one is dwindling. 
 Therefore, his utopia is where the ironist lives in the broadest 
possible private sphere, where they can practice self-creation. This ironist 
now is aware that his final vocabulary does not carry truth and it is limited. 
So, they are able to redescribe anything with their relative vocabulary.  
“Autonomy is not something which all human beings have within them and 
which society can release by ceasing to repress them. It is something which 
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certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-creation, and which a 
few actually do” (ibid: 65). 
  
Conclusion 
 While Mouffe (1996) inimitably puts it that, in Rorty’s opinion, there 
are one final vocabulary where the desire for self-creation and autonomy 
dominates, and another one where what dominates is the desire for 
community, Bernstein (1990) notices a contradiction here. He writes: “It 
seems curious that Rorty, who shows us that most [metaphysical] 
distinctions are fuzzy, vague, and subject to historical contingencies, should 
rely on such a fixed, rigid, ahistorical dichotomy” (Bernstein, 1990: 65-66). 
Rorty, on the other hand, answers the same criticism from Laclau (in 
Mouffe, 1996) by admitting that he might not have offered adequate 
theorizing about this distinction. So he explains: 
 “I do not see how to ‘theorize’ the nature of the partition between the 
private and the public, except to say that by ‘the private’ I mean the 
part of life in which we carry out our duties to ourselves, and do not 
worry about the effects of our actions on others. By the public I mean 
the part in which we do worry about such effects.” (Rorty, 1996a: 76) 
 In fact, he returns to his definition of the liberal aspect of ironist 
which is a kind of ‘moral courage’. He also describes the contingency of 
language, selfhood, and community to show that “society is pulled together 
not by any philosophical grounding but by common vocabularies and 
common hopes” (Laclau, 1991: 88) which both are undertaken by ironist, 
and not on her. 
 Therefore, it can be concluded that Rorty would agree with part of 
structuralism to analyze the contemporary world. Moreover, he shares some 
of the structuralists’ viewpoints on language, discourse, or texts, in addition, 
he does agree to the importance of social institutions in a democracy. 
Nonetheless, the private-public dinstiction is necessary for ironist; the private 
demands for self-creation and the public for human solidarity (Mouffe, 1996) 
and both are upon the will of ironist. Even the solidarity he mentions is not 
similar to what Durkheim says, i.e. a social morphology which keeps citizens 
attached and in harmony, but it is the ironist who brings about solidarity. 
 Thus, it is important to see Rorty in the context of American schools 
of thought (e.g. pragmatism and interactionism) rather than European 
approaches which are more engaged with the study of structure. However, he 
does borrow some ideas from Derrida or Faucoult, because he believes that 
they both are partly acceptable ironists and they seem to have “shared 
Nietzschean suspicions about the tradition of Western philosophy—
suspicions which they share with the American pragmatists” (Rorty, 1996b: 
13). As a matter of fact, such a reading of those European thinkers is for the 
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sake of the agentic aspect of ironist; that means, to cast (Nietzschean) doubt 
on philosophy. He does not even consider this quality strange to American 
pragmatisim. Rorty obviously inclines towards the American side of 
sociology which vouches for human agency. On the other side, he 
acknowledges the significance of work done by European (in-favor-of 
structure) thinkers, even conflict theorists and structuralists (Rorty, 1989, 
1996a). Ironically, He even wishes Marx did not take a degree in philosophy 
and had remained the genius political economist as in his early career (ibid: 
77).  
 Based on Rorty’s idea of favorable citizens of a (utopian) liberal 
democracy, ironist is the exact appropriate citizen of such a society where 
the private sphere is at its maximum size. He does think that this liberal 
utopia is coming soon. Rorty thinks he succeeds in justifying the location of 
ironist in the context of structure-agency dichotomy when his critics ask how 
this democratic agency possible (Mouffe, 1996). Because he is refering not 
to philosophy to answer the question but to the practice, that liberal 
democracy (for example, America) is an ongoing experiment (Rorty, 1991) 
which has evolved for the better and freer. Although it might sound like the 
dialectic of history, he emphsizes on the role of agents in this process. He is 
also prescribing for today while describing the future. An individual who is 
aware that their final vocabularies do not hold the truth and it is going to 
change encountering other final vocabularies, is a tolerant agent, and a more 
preferable citizen. Rorty pictures a wide scope of autonumy for ironist: she 
believes in contingency of language, selfhood, and language, she casts doubt 
on her (and any other) final vocabularies, she is aware of private-public 
dinstiction, she is a liberal, and she builds solidarity and common hope. 
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